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Making Social Security Work for Women and Men
Jonathan Barry Forman*
1. INTRODUCTION
The current Social Security system is wildly redistributive.'
In particular, it provides generous benefits for the spouses and
surviving spouses of covered workers.2 To come up with the money
for these generous benefits, the benefits provided to individual
workers must be less than actuarially fair. In short, the current Social
Security system takes money from workers and gives it to spouses and
surviving spouses.
Not surprisingly, women are the principal recipients of these
spousal benefits. Women tend to spend less time in the paid work
force, women tend to live longer than men, and men tend to marry
younger women.3 The net effect is that the Social Security system has
been pretty good for women.,4 Consequently, any reform of the Social
Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, Northwestern
University; M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of
Michigan; M.A. (Economics) 1983, George Washington University. Delegate to the 1998
National Summit on Retirement Savings. The author wishes to thank Kathryn L. Moore
for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social
Security Retirement Program: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-earner Couples,
45 TAX LAW. 915, 948-57 (1992) and sources cited therein.
2 See generally Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension is it Anyway?
Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1653
(1998); Jonathan Barry Forman, Social Security: What Can be Done About Marriage
Penalties?, 75 TAX NOTES 270 (1997) and 6 S. CAL. REV. L. WOMEN'S STUD. 553 (1997);
Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can be Done About Marriage Penalties?, 30 FAM. L.Q. I
(1996); and Jonathan Barry Forman, Social Security: Why Treat Today's Women as if this
Were the 1930s?, L. A. TIMES, May 4, 1997, at M2.
See infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2061 (1996); Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M.P. McCouch, Women, Fairness, and Social Security, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1209 (1997);
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S
RETIREMENT INCOME (Report No. GAO/HEHS-98-42, Dec. 1997); (NAT'L ECON.
COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOC. SECURITY, WOMEN AND RETIREMENT
SECURITY (October 27, 1998); OLDER WOMEN'S LEAGUE, WOMEN, WORK AND PENSIONS:
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Security system that reduces its redistributive impact could hurt
women.
In particular, women could be harmed significantly if the
current Social Security system is replaced with a fully privatized
system of individual retirement savings accounts (IRSAs). 5  The
reason for this effect is because with IRSAs, there would be no
redistribution at all. Payroll contributions - and the earnings on
those contributions - would remain in individual accounts, and no
money would ever be taken from a worker's account to provide
benefits for other workers or their families. Of course, it might make
sense to compel individual workers to share their retirement accounts
with their own spouses, divorced spouses, surviving spouses, and
other survivors. But there would be no redistribution from one
worker's account to unrelated spouses or to unrelated workers with
lower lifetime earnings.
Still, the government bears the burden of justifying its
redistributive mandates. In that regard, redistribution based on need
seems justifiable to me; that is, it makes sense to redistribute
economic resources from rich to poor. Also, Social Security's
progressive benefit formula currently does redistribute significant
amounts from workers with high lifetime earnings to workers with
IMPROVING THE ODDS FOR A SECURE RETIREMENT (1998); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RETIREMENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON
AGING, 102d CONG., 2d SESS., How WELL DO WOMEN FARE UNDER THE NATION'S
RETIREMENT POLICIES (Comm. Print 1992).
5 See, e.g., PETER J. FERRARA & MICHAEL TANNER, A NEW DEAL FOR SOCIAL
SECURITY (1998); Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform,
71 TEMPLE. L. REV. 131 (1998); and sources cited in Forman, Whose Pension Is It
Anyway? Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, supra note 2,
at 1660-64 (explaining that proponents of complete or partial privatization of Social
Security typically call for replacing all or a portion of the current system with a system of
individual retirement savings accounts (IRSAs)). All or a portion of the Social Security
payroll taxes that workers now pay to the federal government would go instead into
IRSAs. Id. Typically, these IRSAs would operate pretty much like today's Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and employer 401(k) savings plans. I.R.C. §§ 219, 401 (k)
(1994).
6 For example, it could make sense to require each husband and wife to pool
their individual accounts and purchase a joint and survivor annuity that would assure
them both adequate incomes throughout their retirement years.
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low lifetime earnings. 7 Although I might quibble with the basis for
that redistribution, 8 I do believe that it makes sense to have a social
insurance system that redistributes economic resources from rich to
poor.
However, redistribution based on marital status is simply not
justifiable. Yet that is the principal way that the current Social
Security system benefits women. The current system provides
generous spousal benefits. Without doubt, these spousal benefits have
helped women in general. Unfortunately, spousal benefits fail to
adequately target the neediest elderly women - octogenarian
widows, divorcees, and other unmarried women who have had low
lifetime earnings. 9  Moreover, the current system engenders
significant marriage penalties on dual-earner couples and on lesbians
and other unmarried women.
I°
Instead, we should replace the current system of spousal
benefits with an earnings sharing system.'' Under earnings sharing,
each spouse in a married couple would be credited with one-half of
the couple's combined earnings during marriage. To the extent that
earnings sharing alone is insufficient to provide adequate benefits for
elderly beneficiaries, the government should use general revenues to
ensure that no elderly beneficiary has to live in poverty.12
At the outset, Part II of this Article provides an overview of
the current Social Security system. Part III discusses the need for
Social Security reform. Finally, Part IV discusses how earnings
sharing could help form the basis for a social insurance system in
which no elderly Americans would live in poverty.
See infra Part I.B. for an explanation of how Social Security benefits are
computed.
8 See infra Part IV.B.2. See, e.g., Jon Forman, Bill Gates and I Pay Equally
- and This is Supposed to be a Fair System?, L. A. TIMEs, December 25, 1998, at B9.
9 See infra Part III.A.
10 See, e.g., Forman, What Can be Done About Marriage Penalties?, supra
note 2, at 13-19.
See infra Part IV.A.
12 See infra Part IV.B.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The Social Security system includes three programs that
provide monthly cash benefits to workers and their families. The Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program provides monthly cash
benefits to retired workers and their dependents and to survivors of
covered workers, and the Disability Insurance (DI) program provides
monthly cash benefits for disabled workers under age 65 and their
dependents. 13 A worker builds protection under these programs by
working in employment that is covered by Social Security and paying
the applicable payroll taxes. At present, about 96 percent of the work
force is in covered employment. 14 At retirement, disability, or death,
monthly Social Security benefits are paid to insured workers and to
their eligible dependents and survivors. The third program, the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, provides monthly cash
benefits to low-income elderly Americans.15
The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program is, by
far, the largest of these programs, and it is usually what people mean
when they talk about Social Security. In 1997, for example, the OASI
program paid more than $312 billion in benefits to almost 38 million
Americans, and the average benefit paid to a retired worker was about
$765 per month.16 Consequently, for the remainder of this article, the
term "Social Security taxes" will refer to OASI taxes, and the term
"Social Security benefits" will refer to OASI benefits.
13 See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 2D
SESS., 1998 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1-99 (Comm. Print 1998)
(hereinafter "1998 GREEN BOOK"); SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK
1997 (13th ed. 1997); and SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BULL., ANN.
STATISTICAL SUPP. 1997 (1997). See generally Soc. Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49
Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as, and amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f(1999)).
14 See 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 13, at 10.
15 Id. at 261-326. In 1997, for example, the maximum federal SSI benefit for
an individual was $484 per month, and the maximum federal SSI benefit for couples was
$726 per month; however, some states provided small additional supplements. Id. at 277.
16 Current Operating Statistics: List of Tables, 61 SOC. SECURITY BULL. no.
3, at 33, 35, 37, 38 (1998).
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A. Social Security Taxes
Social Security benefits are overwhelmingly financed through
payroll taxes imposed on individuals working in employment or self-
employment that is covered by the Social Security system. 17  For
1999, employees and employers will each pay a tax of 5.35 percent on
up to $72,600 of wages earned in covered employment, for a
combined OASI rate of 10.7 percent (the lion's share of the total rate
of 15.3 percent that is collected for OASI, disability insurance, and
Medicare). 18 Self-employed workers pay an equivalent OASI tax of
10.7 percent on up to $72,600 of net earnings. 19
B. Social Security Benefits
1. Worker Benefits
Workers over age 62 generally are entitled to OASI benefits if
they have worked in covered employment for at least 10 years.
Benefits are based on a measure of the worker's earnings history in
covered employment known as the average indexed monthly earnings
(AIME). Basically, the AIME measures the worker's career-average
monthly earnings in covered employment.
The AIME is linked by a formula to the monthly retirement
benefit payable to the worker at normal retirement age, a benefit
known as the primary insurance amount (PIA). For a worker turning
62 in 1999, the PIA is equal to 90 percent of the first $505 of the
worker's AIME, plus 32 percent of the AIME over $505 and through
17 In addition, as much as 85 percent of a taxpayer's Social Security benefits
is subject to income taxation. The actual amount to be included is determined by
applying a complicated two-tier formula. I.R.C. § 86 (1999). Basically single taxpayers
with incomes over $25,000 and married couples with incomes over $32,000 must include
as much as half of their Social Security benefits in income, and single taxpayers with
incomes over $34,000 and married couples with incomes over $44,000 must include as
much as 85 percent of their Social Security benefits in income.
18 1999 Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations, 63 Fed. Reg.
58,446 (1998) (hereinafter 1999 Social Security COLA Determinations).
19 1Id .
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$3,043 (if any), and plus 15 percent of the AIME over, $3,043 (if
20any). It is worth noting that, on its face, the benefit formula is
progressive, meaning that it is designed to favor workers with
relatively low career-average earnings. 21
Finally, Social Security benefits are indexed for inflation. In
March of 1998, more than 27 million retired workers were collecting




Dependents and survivors of the worker may also receive
additional monthly benefits. 23  These so-called auxiliary benefit
amounts are also based on the worker's PIA.24 In particular, a 65-
year-old wife or husband of a retired worker is entitled to a monthly
spousal benefit equal to 50 percent of the worker's PIA.
Consequently, a retired worker and spouse generally can claim a
monthly benefit equal to 150 percent of what the retired worker alone
could claim. Also, a 65-year-old widow or widower of the worker is
entitled to a monthly surviving spouse benefit equal to 100 percent of
the worker's PIA. 26 In March of 1998, almost 3 million spouses of
retired workers were collecting benefits averaging $393 per month.27
Similarly, almost 5 million surviving spouses were collecting benefits
20 Id.2 1
21 42 U.S.C. § 415(i)(1999).
22 Current Operating Statistics: List of Tables, supra note 16, at 39.
23 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b) (wife), (c) (husband), (d) (child), (e) (widow), (f)
(widower), (g) (mother and father), and (h) (parents)( 1999).
4 See id at (k). Auxiliary benefits are subject to a variety of limitations. In
particular, under the so-called dual entitlement rule, when an individual can claim both a
worker benefit and a benefit as an auxiliary of another worker, only the larger of the two
benefits is paid to the individual. Id.
25 See id. at (b).
26 See id. at (e) & (f); also generally 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 13, at 15
(noting widows and widowers can typically begin drawing benefits at age 60).: •
27 See Current Operating Statistics: List of Table s, supra note 16, at 39.
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averaging $733 per month.
28
3. For Married Couples, Social Security Pays Benefits in the Form of a
Joint and Two-Thirds Survivor Annuity
All in all, Social Security looks a lot like a joint and survivor
annuity program. At retirement, a worker covered by Social Security
is not allowed to withdraw the balance of some bank account - real
or hypothetical. Instead, at retirement, Social Security provides
monthly benefits over the course of the worker's life, and these
benefits are indexed for inflation.29 In short, Social Security pays
benefits in the form of an indexed lifetime annuity.
Moreover, if a worker is married, Social Security pays
monthly benefits over the joint lives of both husband and wife, and
those benefits look like a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity. For
example, consider a one-earner couple with both spouses age 65.
While both the worker and the spouse are alive, they can retire and
claim a monthly benefit equal to roughly 150 percent of what the
worker alone could claim. If the spouse dies, the worker can continue
to claim 100 percent of the worker benefit. Similarly, if the worker
dies, the surviving spouse can claim a benefit equal to 100 percent of
the worker benefit. In effect, Social Security provides most married
couples with an indexed, joint and two-thirds survivor annuity.
30
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. Poverty Among Elderly Women
The success of the Social Security system is that since its
28 Id.
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (1999).
30 The "two-thirds" survivor component reflects the fact that the survivor
benefit (100 percent of the worker's PIA) is two-thirds of the married couple's benefit
when both are alive (150 percent of the worker's PIA for a worker plus spouse).
Mathematically, 2/3 = 100 percent/1 50 percent.
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creation in 1935, poverty rates for the elderly have fallen from an
estimated 50 percent in 1935 to around 11 percent today. 31 At the
same time, however, the failure of Social Security is that it has not
solved the problem of poverty among the elderly. Social Security
alone has not provided adequate income for retirees, yet it is virtually
the only source of income for the lowest 40 percent of Americans.
32
In particular, women continue to face a much higher risk than
men of poverty in old age.33 At the outset, it is worth noting that
women tend to live longer than men and that men tend to marry
younger women. In that regard, the average life expectancy for a
woman age 65 is about 19 years, versus about 15 years for men.
34
Not surprisingly, women make up 72 percent of the increasing
number of Americans over 85 years old.3  Moreover, Americans are
retiring earlier and earlier.36 All in all, the typical couple will spend
about 15 years together in retirement, and the wife will live another 6
years as a widow.37  Indeed, women are five times more likely to
become widowed, 38 and many of these women will find themselves
living below the poverty level.
39  '
31 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR
ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 2 (Report No. GAO/HEHS-98-33, July 1998).
32 See CHRISTOPHER CONTE, AGENDA BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR THE
NATIONAL SUMMIT ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS: JUNE 4-5, 1998, at 4 (American Savings
Education Council 1998). See also NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING
GROUP ON SOC. SECURITY, supra note 4, at 7 (stating "For 25% of unmarried women,
Social Security is their only source of income").
See, e.g., NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOC.
SECURITY, supra note 4, at 5, 7, 12-13.
341998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 13, at 103 1.
See NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOC.
SECURITY, supra note 4, at 7.
36 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming Social Security to Encourage the
Elderly to Work, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 289, 292 (1998).
37 Howard M. lams & Stephen J. Sandell, Cost-Neutral Policies to Increase
Social Security Benefits for Widows: A Simulation for 1992, 61 SOC. SECURITY BULL. no.
1, at 34, 37 (1998).
38 See Camilla E. Watson, The Pension Game. Age-and Gender-based
Inequities in the Retirement System, 25 GA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990).
See David A. Weaver, The Economic Well-Being of Social Security
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Elderly divorced women are particularly at risk. They tend to
have an exceptionally high incidence of poverty (around 30 percent),
an unusually high incidence of serious health problems, and low
Social Security benefits.
40
Moreover, despite their greater need for retirement income,
women have not found much support in the labor market or in the
private retirement system. 41  In fact, there is a particularly large
gender gap in the private retirement system.42 For example, while
46.5 percent of men over age 65 in 1995 received pension and/or
annuity income averaging $11,460 per year, only 26.4 percent of
women over age 65 that year received a pension or annuity, and these
43averaged just $6,684 per year. Moreover, women age 50 or over are
more likely to receive a pension benefit through their husbands (as
spouses or survivors) than through their own savings or
employment.44
There are many reasons for the gender gap in private
retirement income.45 In particular, women tend to earn less than men.
Also, women tend to work for smaller companies that are less likely
to have a retirement plan, and women also tend to spend more time
away from the workplace to raise a family or care for an aging
relative. For example, one study found a strong association between
Beneficiaries, with an Emphasis on Divorced Beneficiaries, 60 Soc. SECURITY BULL. no
4, at 3 (1997); David E. Ott, Survivor Income Benefits Provided by Employers, 114
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 13 (June 1991); MICHAEL D. HURD & DAVID A. WISE, THE WEALTH
AND POVERTY OF WIDOWS (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
2325, 1987).
40 See Weaver, supra note 39; also Donald T. Ferron, Social Security
Benefits for Women Aged 62 or Older, 60 Soc. SECURITY BULL. no. 4, at 32 (1997).
41 NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOC. SECURITY,
supra note 4.
42 Id. at 15-16.
43EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS 63 (4th ed. 1997).
Id.
45 See NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOC.
SECURITY, supra note 4; William E. Even & David A. Macphearson, Gender Difference
in Pensions, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 555 (1994).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
marital and fertility decisions and pension coverage. 46 On the other
hand, because younger women today spend more time in the work
force and at more equal salaries, the financial security of women is
likely to improve somewhat over time.
47
Still, even if women benefit from increasing pension coverage,
they are likely to face a greater risk of poverty than men because of
their longer life expectancies. In particular, because relatively few
private retirement plans are indexed for inflation, elderly women will
often find their purchasing power diminished over the course of
retirement.48  All in all, there is a significant risk that millions of
elderly women will outlive their resources, and that octogenarian
widows and divorcees will be among the hardest hit.
B. The Current Social Security System Unfairly Redistributes
Economic Resources Based On Marital Status
A casual observer of the current Social Security system would
see that it is a pay-as-you-go social welfare system that takes payroll
taxes from current workers and redistributes those funds to current
retirees and their families. On closer inspection, however, most
experts agree that the best way to understand Social Security's
distributional features is to evaluate the program's impact over the
course of a worker's lifetime.49 This lifetime perspective leads to a
comparison between the Social Security taxes paid by a worker and
the expected benefits.
50
46 See Even & Macphearson, supra note 45.
Id.; see also Sophie M. Korcyzk, Are Women's Jobs Getting Better, or Are
Women Getting Better Jobs?, in PENSION COVERAGE ISSUES FOR THE '90s, 61 (U.S. Dep't
of Lab., Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin. ed., 1994); Robin L. Lumsdaine et al.,
Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement: Men and Women, Medicare, and Models, in
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 183 (David A. Wise ed., 1994).
48 Watson, supra note 38, at 32.
49 See, e.g., Forman, supra note I, at 937-48.
50 Id. For example, one might compare the expected value at age 65 of the
OASI taxes that a worker paid over a career, together with interest at a market rate on
those tax payments, with the expected value at age 65 of the stream of OASI benefits that
the worker can expect to receive for life. The worker will receive his or her "money's
worth" if the expected value of benefits to be received equals the expected value of all
368 [Vol. XVI
1999] MAKING SOCIAL SECURITY WORK 369
Numerous studies have made just such comparisons. 5 1 Their
results clearly show that the link between the Social Security taxes
paid by a worker and the expected benefits is quite loose and can vary
dramatically depending on such factors as family status, income, and
age. 52 In short, not everyone gets his or her "money's worth."
In particular, to come up with the money for spousal benefits,
the benefits provided to individual workers must be less than
actuarially fair. In essence, workers subsidize the Social Security
benefits provided to spouses and surviving spouses. For example, a
single worker with no dependents can receive a benefit at age 65 of
just 100 percent of the worker's PIA, while a worker with a spouse
(who has also reached age 65) can receive a benefit equal to 150
percent of the worker's PIA. Similarly, a surviving spouse of a
worker can continue to receive a benefit equal to 100 percent of the
worker's benefit long after the worker has died. These "extra"
benefits for spouses are paid for by reducing the benefits available to
workers, including unmarried workers.
Perhaps worse still, the current Social Security' system creates
significant marriage penalties and bonuses. 53  Indeed, couples with
equal total earnings can receive dramatically different amounts of
benefits, depending upon how much is earned by each spouse.
taxes paid. If the expected value of taxes paid exceeds the expected value of benefits,
then the worker would, in effect, be paying other program participants. But if the
expected value of benefits exceeds the expected value of the taxes paid, then the worker
would be receiving extra benefits from other participants. Id.
51 See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal
Across and Within Generations, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 19 (1987).
52 Forman, supra note 1, at 937-48. In general, the current Social Security
system favors early generations of retirees over later generations, low earners over high
earners, married couples over single individuals, larger families over smaller families,
single-earner couples over dual-earner couples, and elderly retirees over elderly workers.
Id.
See, e.g., Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties?, supra
note 2, at 16-19.
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IV. TOWARDS AN EARNINGS SHARING SOLUTION
A. The Earnings Sharing Approach
I. The Marital Partnership Principle
As a general proposition, we believe that marriage is a
partnership in which spouses share benefits and responsibilities. This
is the marital partnership principle. Based on this principle, state
divorce laws authorize alimony and property division orders, and state
probate laws typically guarantee that a surviving spouse will get a
share of a predeceasing spouse's estate.
For example, at divorce, most states try to achieve an
equitable distribution of marital property. Absent evidence to the
contrary, divorce law presumes that equal division of the marital
property is the most equitable. In that regard, the courts typically treat
private pensions as marital property that can be divided at divorce.
54
2. Earnings Sharing
As creatures of federal law, Social Security benefits are not
subject to division by state family courts. In theory, however, the
marital partnership principle could be applied to Social Security
benefit accruals. Federal law could be amended to use the so-called
54 See David L. Baumer & J. C. Poindexter, Women and Divorce: The Perils
of Pension Division, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 203, 213 (1996). Often, where the duration of the
pension-producing employment and the marriage are not the same, the courts utilize the
so-called "coverture fraction" to determine what portion of the private pension is marital
property and what portion is the participant's individual property. Id. The fraction is
determined by dividing the number of years of simultaneous marriage and employment
by the total employment time. Id. For example, if an employee worked for 20 years on
the job that resulted in the pension benefits but was married for just 12 of those years
before divorce, the marital property share would be just 60 percent (60% = 12/20) of the
value of the pension at divorce. Id. See also, Mary A. Throne, Pension Awards in
Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 194 (1988); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital
Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other
Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1250
(1986).
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"earnings sharing" approach for dividing Social Security benefits
between married spouses. 55 In its simplest form, earnings sharing
would eliminate the current Social Security system's spouse and
surviving spouse benefits. Instead, each spouse in a married couple
would be credited with one-half of the couple's combined earnings
during marriage. In the end, each spouse's Social Security benefit
would be based on one-half of the married couple's earnings credits
during marriage plus whatever earnings credits each of them accrued
before or after the marriage.
For example, consider a couple in which the primary worker
earned $40,000 in a given year and the secondary worker earned
$10,000. Under the current Social Security system, the primary
worker is credited with $40,000 of earnings, and the secondary worker
is credited with just $10,000 of earnings. Under earnings sharing,
each would be credited with $25,000 of earnings for that year for
purposes of computing benefits.
B. Ensuring Retirement Income Adequacy
I. The Principle of Retirement Income Adequacy
We believe that left to their own devices, many individuals
will not save enough for their own retirement. Consequently, we have
empowered our government to enact paternalistic Social Security and
pension policies to ensure that workers will, in fact, save for their own•56 ...
retirement. This is the principle of retirement income adequacy.
Indeed, Social Security's current spousal benefit rules stem
from paternalistic governmental efforts to achieve adequate retirement
incomes for the spouses of covered workers. But they have not
See, e.g, STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 99TH CONG.,
IST SESS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REPORT OF EARNINGS SHARING
IMPLEMENTATION STUDY (Comm. Print 1985); U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., EARNINGS
SHARING OPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (1986).
56 See LAWRENCE THOMPSON, OLDER AND WISE: THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
PENSIONS (1998); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological
Evidence and Economic Theory, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
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worked. Far too many elderly widows and divorcees are living in
poverty.
57
2. Guaranteeing Adequate Incomes to the Elderly
Earnings sharing, by itself, would not ensure that all elderly
Americans would avoid the ravages of poverty. However, earnings
sharing, together with a more progressive social insurance system,
could ensure adequate retirement incomes for the elderly.5 8 In short,
we need to have a social insurance system that redistributes economic
resources in a way that ensures that all of our elderly citizens have
adequate retirement incomes.
At a minimum, each elderly individual and couple needs to be
assured an income at least equal to the poverty level. In 1999, for
example, the poverty level for an unmarried individual is $8,240, and
the poverty level for a married couple is $11,060. 59  Our social
insurance system should assure that all elderly individuals and couples
have at least such poverty-level incomes. This result could be
achieved largely with a more progressive Social Security benefit
computation formula.
60
Unfortunately, the Social Security payroll tax is not the proper
tool to achieve such redistribution. The current Social Security tax
system only redistributes money from workers with modest lifetime
earnings to workers with low lifetime earnings and their families.
This year, for example, the Social Security tax system does not reach
earnings in excess of $72,600. 6 1 Moreover, as a tax on earnings, the
Social Security tax simply does not reach investment income or
wealth. Consequently, the tax does not reach coupon-clipping trust-
See supra Part III.A.
58 It might also make sense to require married couples to pool their Social
Security accruals at retirement and use the combined balance towards a joint-and-
survivor-annuity type of benefit.
Annual Update of the Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines, 64
Fed. Reg. 13428 (1999).
60 Alternatively, eliminating poverty among the elderly could be achieved
through an exj ansion of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
6-See 1999 Social Security COLA Determinations, supra note 18.
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fund kids and other high-income non-working investors.
If redistribution is called for (and I believe that it is), why
should only those with modest earnings be called upon to subsidize
the benefits of workers with low lifetime earnings and their spouses
and surviving spouses? It seems to me that it would be more
appropriate to use the income tax system or a wealth tax system to
achieve such redistribution.62
The ultimate details of such a reformed system for financing
Social Security benefits are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it
to say, however, that I applaud President Clinton's recent suggestion
that we transfer 62 percent of the projected budget surpluses over the
next 15 years - more than $2.7 trillion - to the Social Security
system.63  That's $2.7 trillion from general revenues, not from
additional payroll taxes.
V. CONCLUSION
It makes sense to have a social insurance system that
redistributes economic resources from rich to poor. But it is unfair for
our Social Security system to redistribute economic resources based
on marital status. Doing so penalizes unmarried individuals and dual-
earner couples, and it has failed to ensure that all elderly Americans
have adequate retirement incomes. The time has come to fix Social
Security by adopting earnings sharing and finding a better way to
redistribute economic resources to benefit low-income elderly
Americans. Then we would have a Social Security system that
worked for women and men.
62 See Forman, supra note 8.
63 See, e.g., Mark Felenthal, Social Security: Clinton Offer to Spend Surplus:
Social Security Reform Leads Agenda, 26 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 197 (Jan. 25, 1999).
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